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Comanagement Between Federal Agencies and Native American Tribes:
Applications and Lessons
Faculty Mentor: Martin Nie
The Badger Two Medicine Area in the Lewis and Clark National Forest has faced
conflict over management since the 1980s due to leasing of what is considered
sacred land. Recently those leases were cancelled. However questions about how to
manage the land still remain. This paper explores examples of comanagement
between the federal government and Native American tribes in an effort to
understand what options and obstacles the Blackfeet tribe will face in future
management of the Badger Two Medicine Area. I examined the National Bison
Range and Badlands National Park efforts at comanagement in depth and additional
current comanagement situations with other federal agencies. Background
information is provided on both of these topics. This policy piece found that
comanagement suffered at both the National Bison Range and Badlands National
Park due to poor communication, political and personal issues within agencies, and
issues beyond agency control, such as funding. In situations where comanagement
has been successful, strong interpersonal relationships and effective communication
have played a significant role.

Comanagement Between Federal Agencies And Native American Tribes:
Applications and Lessons

Describe the political and legal context of co-management on the National Bison
Range.

For decades the Nation Bison Range (NBR) has been the subject of intense
negotiations between the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT). These negotiations have been part of
the larger push for more co-management between federal agencies and tribes. It has been
a long difficult process for the groups involved and this paper is intended to simply
provide a general history and overview of the situation.
The NBR is a wildlife refuge situated in northwest Montana that is part of the
USFWS. It is important to keep in mind that the USFWS is part of the Department of the
Interior (DOI). The NBR was created in 1908 to protect the few remaining buffalo left in
the United States (Reffalt, et al., 2008). The NBR lies on the Flathead Indian Reservation,
which belongs to the CSKT. This reservation was created in 1855 through the Hellgate
Treaty (Upton, 2014).
The NBR is of particular significance for the CSKT because of the considerable
cultural bonds tying the tribes to the bison themselves and the land that the NBR rests on.
Bison were historically hunted by the CSKT and thus there are many historical and
traditional tribal practices that are related to bison. The CSKT feel an even deeper
connection to the NBR because many of the bison of the NBR exist today due to efforts
of past CSKT members to preserve bison (Reffalt et al., 2008; Stumpff, 2010). The
CSKT call themselves a people of vision and it is fitting that they had the foresight to
preserve bison in their worst time. They want to continue that tradition and continue to
help preserve and manage bison for future generations. Furthermore the land for the
refuge was appropriated from the tribes despite tribal opposition. The 1904 Flathead
Allotment Act, through the Dawes Act, allowed allotments of land on the reservation to
be given to non-Indian homesteaders and permitted the purchase of land for the NBR.
(Reffalt et al. 2008; Upton, 2014; Lyons, 2005).

It is partly because of these deep cultural ties to bison and the location of the
NBR, that the CSKT have wanted a greater role in managing the NBR. In the 1990s this
became possible with the passage of the Tribal Self Governance Act (TSGA) of 1994.
The TSGA, “is a federal law that authorizes Indian tribes to contract for the operation of
DOI programs of specific significance to tribes” (Upton, 2014). The TSGA amended the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) and created
contracts, which are known as annual funding agreements (AFA) (Reed v. Salazar, 2010).
It is crucial to note that the TSGA only applies to DOI programs and no other federal
programs.
The TSGA was and is a huge step forward for the concept of co-management. It
forces federal agencies to work with tribes on a government-to-government basis and
recognize that these tribes bring something different yet equally meaningful to the
management of public lands. This allows and can encourage tribes to become much more
involved in the management of a resource. This could have considerable implications if it
was able to be successfully realized (King, 2007). However as can be seen with the NBR,
this is not always the case and there can be many hurdles along the way.
The NBR co-management saga begins in 1994 with the passage of the TSGA.
Soon after its passage the CSKT entered into discussions with the USFWS towards
creating and implementing a co-management plan on the NBR. Finally in 2004, 10 years
after negotiations began, an agreement was reached creating the first AFA. This was
signed in December 2004 and became effective in March 2005. In March 2006, “FWS’s
Project Leader for the NBRC, Steven Kallin, compiled a report on the CSKT’s
implementation of the AFA” for the previous year. It claimed that the CSKT performance
on the NBR was not satisfactory. The situation escalated from there, culminating in a
request from the Project Leader to terminate the CSKT authority to operate on the NBR
and to end negotiations for another AFA. This was granted in December 2006. This
decision was appealed by the CSKT in January citing, “that FWS had improperly
terminated the AFA without prior notice to the CSKT and that FWS had not notified the
CSKT of alleged deficiencies and given them an opportunity to respond to them” (Reed
v. Salazar, 2010). The situation had essentially turned into a war of words with little

beneficial communication occurring on the ground.
Eventually the Deputy Secretary of the Interior became involved and indicated
that another AFA would be created. A new draft AFA was submitted in May 2007 but
was not signed until June 2008, due to prolonged negotiations. This 2008 AFA was then
sued in 2010 by various groups under allegations of violating the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of
1966, among others. Many of the groups that brought suit had a strong federal
government background, or were considered part of a, “USFWS retiree/employee base”.
These groups mentioned concerns with the AFA due to staffing, budget, and
privatization/politicization of the USFWS (Stumpff, 2010). The courts found that the
2008 AFA did violate NEPA because the USFWS failed to properly explain why the
AFA was a categorical exclusion (Reed v. Salazar, 2010; Upton, 2014). This was a
technicality and did not really address any of the underlying issues of why the plaintiffs
were upset with the AFA.
With that decision the CSKT and USFWS went back to work to complete a new
AFA and prepare an environmental assessment to accompany that AFA. The latest draft
AFA was released in August 2014 and comments were allowed through September 2014
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2014). It is not currently in effect and it remains to be
seen if any groups will file suit or if this AFA will turn out to be more successful than its
predecessors (Lisk, 2015).

What are the major political and legal arguments made in opposition to the comanagement of the National Bison Range?

When people generally refer to the lawsuit brought against the National Bison
Range (NBR) for the 2008 Annual Funding Agreement (AFA), they tend to refer to it as
the PEER lawsuit. It is important to know who PEER is to understand their motivations
for suing the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) in regards to this AFA.
However this lawsuit at its core, also helps us recognize deeper concerns regarding comanagement.
PEER stands for Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility. PEER is
non-profit, environmental organization that works with both federal and state resource
agency professionals. PEER often acts as government watch dog and is used as resource
by whistleblowers who are afraid of retaliation from their agency (PEER, 2015). When
PEER brought suit against the USFWS they claimed that the 2008 AFA violated the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (NWRSA), the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). The court found that the 2008 AFA did vioate NEPA and thus struck
down the 2008 AFA (Reed v. Salazar, 2010).
However many of the laws mentioned above were just used as a technicality to
stop the 2008 AFA. When examining PEER news releases and editorials, many
arguments arise that have nothing to do with the laws above (Hocutt, 2007; PEER 2012,
PEER 2014). Many of the arguments can be broken down into two main categories; those
having to do with funding and employment and those having to do with privatization.
When George W. Bush became president in 2001, America’s federal lands experienced a
dramatic shift in funding and policy. The USFWS was particularly hard hit, experiencing
funding cuts, “that threatened up to 25% of the agency workforce”. The NBR was no
exception to these cuts, feeling the general pressure to downsize and reduce regulation
(Stumpff, 2010).
This atmosphere of fear, combined with the news of the AFA generated animosity
and distrust among USFWS employees. To begin with, there were claims that the first

AFA was essentially negotiated only between upper management, without much input
from lower level employees or public comments (King, 2007; PEER, 2014). Then when
the AFA was released, it basically gave USFWS employees’ two options. These
employees could either go work for the CSKT or be reassigned to another Refuge,
dependent of funding, which was unlikely to happen (Stumpff, 2010). This combination
led to the filing of employee grievances and the relationship between USFWS and CSKT
employees quickly soured.
The most recent comments from PEER regarding the third AFA focus on job
fears again. A press release from PEER criticizing the third, most recent AFA says, “The
EA does not analyze how the changes in staff will affect the resource” and “The short
term and uncertain nature of these jobs make it hard to hire “experienced staff” from the
CSKT” (PEER, 2014). At their core, these comments reflect fears about the safety and
security of jobs with the USFWS and a strong commitment to the USFWS mission, both
of which are under attack as a result of increased political and budget pressures.
Intertwined with these budget cuts was the idea that privatization and less
regulation would help reduce costs on federal lands (Crompton, 1998; More, 2005). This
fear for employees and public land enthusiasts increased in 2007, when the NBR staff
was reduced from 17 to 6.3 permanent full-time employees (Stumpff, 2010). It seemed
that policy was determined to make the NBR private. Part of this fear justly stems from
the fact that tribal documents cannot be accessed under the FOIA. According to the most
recent AFA, “records of the CSKT shall not be considered Federal records for the
purpose of the FOIA. The FOIA does not apply to records maintained solely by CSKT.”
Under FOIA, any USFWS documents are accessible for the public. However with this
transfer of duties, the public has limited access to documents concerning the NBR (PEER
2012; United States, 2012). This reduces oversight and makes it much more difficult for
the American people to have a say in the NBR. For many, this violated the inherently
public nature of national refuges and the mission of the USFWS.
This fear was compounded by the fact that the NBR is one of the few national
refuges without a Comprehensive Conservation Plan (CCP) (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, 2015). The CCP as a guide for the Refuge, detailing what the Refuge wants to
achieve and how it will do so. Without a CCP, many were afraid of what would happen

to the NBR if it had no long-term management guide for the CSKT to follow. Another
large fear stemming from this was the precedent it set for other national refuges and
parks. There was and still is no national strategy for AFA’s and so each agreement is
negotiated on an ad hoc basis. Critics were worried that the NBR with no CCP and heavy
funding cuts was a poor choice for one of the first national refuge AFA’s.
Another common argument against the AFA that falls into the privatization
category is that the AFA gives inherently federal actions to a group that is not a federal
agency. The ISDEAA under the Tribal Self Governance Act (TSGA) of 1994 allows
Indian tribes to contract for the operation of DOI programs of specific significance to
tribes” through AFA’s. However these contracts cannot include any action or program
that is considered inherently federal. (Reed v Salazar, 2010; Upton, 2014). This brings up
this discussion of what inherently federal means and comes down to the core of what
actions people think federal agencies should alone be responsible for. The idea of
inherently federal actions is also inseparable from job security because those are jobs that
stay with the USFWS and are not transferred to the CSKT.
It remains to be seen with the third and most recent AFA, if the agreement will
last. PEER, current, and former USFWS employees still have fears, while the USFWS
will most likely face yet another policy change with the imminent retirement of the
Obama administration. Issues of transparency, finances, personal relationships, and
privatization continue to plague the NBR. What is ironic, is that it appears the first AFA
protected the NBR somewhat from budget cuts at the time and begs the question of what
could have been for the NBR, had the second, 2008, AFA been successful (Stumpff,
2010).

What lessons can other Native Nations learn from the National Bison Range
experience?

The National Bison Range (NBR) co-management situation is unique in many
ways. This is due mostly to agency concerns and the people involved. This will of course
be different for every co-management situation. However there are some important
lessons that can be taken away from this situation and applied elsewhere. The NBR comanagement saga illustrates the importance of effective communication.
Right away it is important to note key administrative differences between the
NBR and the Badger Two Medicine Area. The NBR is managed by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), which is part of the Department of the Interior
(DOI). The Badger Two Medicine Area is part of the Lewis and Clark National Forest.
This national forest is managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS), which is part
of the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA and the DOI function under a very
different set of laws and one of these is the Tribal Self Governance Act (TSGA) of 1994.
Under the Tribal Self Governance Act (TSGA) of 1994 Indian tribes can,
“contract for the operation of DOI programs of specific significance to tribes” (Upton,
2014). This only applies to DOI programs and allows the DOI to consider comanagement an option, which the USFS cannot (Nie, 2008). This means something like
the AFA for the NBR can never technically be applied to the Badger Two Medicine Area.
However some current proposed partnership solutions seem very similar in substance to
the NBR AFA and could head down a similar, extended, unproductive negotiation
pathway (Flora, 2014). On the other hand, because the USFS is under no forced
imperative to co-manage the area, unlike the USFWS, this could lead to more flexible,
willing, and productive discussions about collaborations in the first place.
Another important difference between the NBR and the Badger Two Medicine
Area is that at the time of the first AFA and when negotiations first started for comanaging the NBR, those decisions were precedent setting for the National Wildlife
Refuge system. At the time of the TSGA in 1994, no AFA’s had been created outside the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Today they still remain relatively few (Upton, 2014).
However for the Badger Two Medicine Area, greater tribal involvement and ideas of co-

management are not precedent setting. There are now other examples that can used to
provide guidance from the Grand Portage National Monument (GPNM) work with the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (MCT) and Grand Portage Band of Minnesota Chippewa
(Band) to the Santa Rosa and San Jacincto Mountains National Monument work with the
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (King, 2007; Nie, 2008; Upton 2014).
Looking at these previous examples of co-management and similar partnerships, a
common theme that starts to emerge is the importance of effective communication. The
two ends of this dichotomy arise from the NBR and the GPNM examples. With the
GPNM, the Tribe and Band initiated talks with the National Park Service (NPS) and from
there negotiations proceeded. In it’s enabling legislation, “the Monument was specifically
established “to work with the Grand Portage Band”. This clear establishment of
expectations from both parties helped set the stage for future efforts. “The Band and
GPNM staffs communicate daily” and throughout the history of the Monument, the Band,
MCT, and NPS have continued to work together on a variety of other projects,
communicating and building a stronger partnership as the years have passed (King,
2007).
Compare this to the NBR range where a major issue with the AFA’s is how to
communicate effectively between the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT)
and the USFWS. Part of the reason the first NBR AFA failed so miserably was poor
communication. The situation turned into a game of he said she said with the CSKT
claiming, “that FWS had not notified the CSKT of alleged deficiencies and given them an
opportunity to respond to them” and the USFWS claiming the CSKT were not doing their
job. Furthermore, for the 2008 AFA, negotiations dragged on and outside representatives
had to be brought in (Reed v Salazar, 2010).
Other examples where effective communication has been crucial to success
include the Santa Rosa and San Jacincto Mountains National Monument work with the
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians and the Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks National
Monument work with the Cochiti Pueblo. For the Santa Rosa and San Jacincto
Monument, legislation for the area recognized its importance to the Cahuilla Indians and
thus incorporated ways to make these Indian voices and opinions heard into parts of the
management process. This means departments now have to, “make a special effort to

consult with representatives of the [Tribe]” and there are now committees which include
tribal members, allowing them to offer opinions on management plans (Nie, 2008).
When creating the Kasha-Katuwe Monument, more cooperation was called for
between the Pueblo de Cochiti and the BLM in managing the area. Part of the
effectiveness of a new agreement was because the BLM, “was able to negotiate directly
with the Governor and leadership of the Pueblo de Cochiti in an atmosphere of mutual
respect and trust” (Nie, 2008). Both of these are examples of cooperative agreements
where tribes and federal agencies came together with a willingness to recognize tribal
voices and communicate with those opinions.
It is also important for the Blackfeet Tribe to recognize the importance of
informal personal relationships. It does not matter if legally co-management is the right
thing to do if the people who have to enforce and be part of the agreement are not
satisfied. Part of the reason the GPNM AFA was so successful was because of the
employees. All staff members, except for one, were willing to work under the Band, and
not the NPS (King, 2007). In addition, the Superintendent of the GPNM was incredibly
supportive of the project and provided strong leadership throughout the planning process
(Upton, 2014). Without this support from leadership in an informal context, the project
could have failed. Compare this to the NBR, where there was personal resistance from
USFWS employees from the start and the regional refuge chief announced his lack of
support during negotiations (Stumpff, 2010). Harmful informal relationships hampered
the project from the start.
Another example of the importance of informal personal relationships comes from
state fisheries management in Washington. In the 1970s, courts decided that tribes could
manage their own fisheries. This was strongly opposed by the state government and
became an engrained mentality in natural resource agency personnel. However with the
election of a new governor, this stance was reversed. But the mentality was still
entrenched in the minds of those making natural resource decisions. It took, “the
replacement of 6 of the 8 senior people in the agency, to reverse the…mentality”
(Pinkerton, 1992). Never forget the significance of informal relationships when making
decisions.

What the NBR situation demonstrates is that willing partners who can clearly
communicate expectations and are able to discuss mistakes and improvements make a
huge difference. The biggest problem for the NBR has been the lack of this. The USFWS
did not clearly communicate with its employees, generating an atmosphere of fear and
distrust. However the CSKT did not help by poorly communicating with USFWS
employees themselves. This deteriorated into poor informal relationships and has plagued
the NBR AFA’s ever since. The biggest implication of this for the Blackfeet Tribe and
future management of the Badger Two Medicine Area is that clear effective
communication needs to be maintained as a priority as the project progresses. Fears and
concerns need to be addressed head on, with transparent language and negotiations. It
will be hard to achieve much otherwise. It’s also important to note though, that however
frustrating the situation has been for the CSKT, they have not walked away from the
NBR. They know how important the Refuge is to themselves and have been willing to
persevere all these years. I would advocate the same for the Blackfeet tribe; no matter
what tribulations the future holds.

Provide a concise, up-to-date description and analysis of the Badlands National
Park planning process, with a focus on possible management options regarding the
Oglala Sioux Tribe. What is the current situation? How were the management
options analyzed in NEPA? What relevance, if any, does this story have for the
possible future management of the Badger Two Medicine?
For decades the relationship between National Park Service and the Oglala Lakota
Tribe (OLT) regarding Badlands National Park (BNP) has been contentious. This is due
to the significant cultural value of the area to the OLT and disagreements over how such
area should be managed. In an effort to give the OLT a greater voice in the management
of the Park, especially the South Unit, various co-management situations have come
under consideration. In this paper I will look at the preferred management option of the
nations first Tribal National Park and how this idea has worked out in reality.
Badlands National Park is located in the southwest corner of South Dakota, near
Rapid City, SD. BNP was first authorized as a national monument in 1929 but was not
established until 1939. The monument was then designated as a national park in 1978.
BNP is split into two units, the North and the South. Land for the initial monument was
land that was originally supposed to be part of the Greater Sioux Reservation. The
Greater Sioux Reservation was a massive reservation established in 1868 with the Fort
Laramie treaty. However by 1889 the Greater Sioux Reservation was broken up and
whittled away by treaties and reduced to 5 smaller reservations, one of which was the
Pine Ridge Reservation (Lovell, 2014). This set the stage for an exclusionary relationship
between the NPS and OLT.
This relationship deteriorated further in 1942, when the United States War
Department took land from the Pine Ridge Reservation to create a gunnery range for
training purposes for World War II. Families on this land were forced to leave on short
notice and many thought they would be able to return to their lands once the war was
over. However this was not the case and in 1968 the land was declared excess property.
With this decision some of the land was returned and some was not. Instead, that land
was held in trust for the Tribe by the federal government. But the land was only held in
trust if the tribe agreed. If the tribe did not agree then the land was permanently lost. So

essentially, “only by surrendering management of the land to the Park Service would the
land be held in trust for the Tribe”. This land was then used to help create the South Unit
and expand the Monument, allowing it to become a National Park (Lovell, 2014; Upton
2014).
In an effort the help repair this exclusionary and negative relationship the NPS
entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in 1976 with the OLT that, “legally
mandated a co-management agreement” (Lovell, 2014). This MOA required the NPS to
work with the tribe in managing the South Unit and gives the tribe a share, “of any
federally assessed entrance fees” (Upton, 2014). This relationship between the NPS and
OLT was negative for many years and has only recently deepened. With the growth in
trust between the two parties, it was decided that Park Service general management plan
could be used to develop management options for the South Unit (Lovell, 2014; Upton
2014).
This management option planning process began in 2006 and ended in 2012 with
the issuance of an environmental impact statement (EIS), followed by a record of
decision (ROD) for the EIS later the same year. Decisions were reached through the
traditional planning process with public scoping and public involvement that, “included
public meetings, newsletters, planning team meetings with NPS and Tribal members,
review of public and agency comments, and incorporation of ideas into alternatives”
(United States, 2012).
NPS staff, tribal members, and the liaison for the tribal council, the Oglala Sioux
Parks and Recreation Authority (OSPRA), all worked together to create the EIS and
general management plan for the South Unit. It is also important to note that a new
superintendent for BNP provided strong leadership for the project. He felt that active
tribal participation was important and this led to an agreement that equal participation
from both sides was a requirement during the planning process (Lovell, 2014).
Ultimately this planning process led to a preferred management option and a
preferred alternative for the management of resources and visitor experiences. The
preferred management option was a Tribal National Park that would require
Congressional action to establish the South Unit as a distinct park. This was option 2 out
of 7. The preferred alternative for the management of resources and visitor experiences

was to, “protect resources while expanding interpretive experience”. This was alternative
4, out of 4 (United States, 2012). This was a two tiered decision, looking to include the
tribe not only in the daily management experience but also looking for tribal comanagement long term.
The 6 other management options were continued current management, shared
management between the NPS and OLT, an connected area that “would be managed
solely by the OST as an affiliated area of the national park system”, the South Unit would
become a new national park, deauthorization of the South Unit with OLT management,
or a tribal park. The 3 other alternatives for the management of resources and visitor
experiences were alternative A: no action, alternative B: “expanded access and
opportunities for visitors to the South Unit”, and alternative C: a heavy focus, “on
preservation and protection of natural and cultural resources, and restoration of natural
systems” (United States, 2012).
When making decisions about the management options there was no outright
analysis of specific impacts like there were for the alternatives for the management of
resources and visitor experiences. However when reading through the management
options, there are underlying subjects that come up repeatedly and were clearly important
when considering the preferred management options. These subjects include
administrative functions, funding, management of resources, staffing responsibilities,
visitor experiences, implementation of EIS, and the application of federal laws, especially
in the context of tribal law (United States, 2012).
This agreement and decision seemed full of potential at the time, not only for the
NPS and the OLT but also for tribes across the country. A Tribal National Park founded
on such collaboration could have acted as a model and set the stage for many other such
projects. However since the publication of the ROD, it seems the Badlands Tribal
National Park has floundered. This is due partly to issues beyond the control of the NPS
and the OLT but also because of relationships between and from within the parties
involved.
When the EIS was issued, the parties involved recognized that there might not be
funding available and that Congressional action was needed to create a Tribal National
Park. Since 2012 neither of these items have been forthcoming. The EIS specifically

recognizes that, “all projects will be contingent on funding from Congress” (United
States, 2012). So if Congress is unwilling to provide to funds or actions necessary to
create a Tribal National Park, it will not happen. As of 2014, only one member of South
Dakota's congressional delegation had endorsed the proposal and that senator chose not
to seek reelection the next year (Upton, 2014).
Meanwhile relationships between the NPS and the OLT have stagnated and
people within the tribe remain ambivalent about the project. Most recently according to
Tupper of the Rapid City Journal, “the Oglala Sioux Tribe has passed a resolution halting
its participation in the project. Badlands National Park, meanwhile, is withholding
$442,000 of the tribe’s share of park gate receipts because of the tribe’s failure to produce
required annual financial reports” (Tupper, 2015).
Part of this problem stems from a lack of communication on both sides. Tribal
members that once supported the project now oppose it and it seems there is a general
lack of support from tribal members (Borrell, 2013; Tupper 2015). While the NPS did try
to involve tribal members in the planning process, there were low attendance levels at
public participation meetings and the EIS only records that a total of 361 comments were
submitted for the final EIS (Lovell, 2014; United States, 2012). This is a fairly small
amount and could be indication that tribal members were not involved as much as
possible.
The NPS also has not communicated as much as it could have. The NPS says that
it, “began withholding the tribe’s half of the North Unit gate receipts in mid-2014
because of the tribe’s failure to produce required reports”. The tribe claims it refused to
submit the reports because there is no language in the 1976 MOA requiring them to do
so. The NPS disagrees (Tupper, 2015). With this dispute it’s not clear how much the NPS
has tried to resolve the problem and figure out why exactly the tribe doesn’t want to
submit the reports or if a solution can be discovered between the two parties.
There are several important lessons that can be drawn from this process. Some
things such as funding are beyond the control of the NPS and tribe to some extent.
However clear communication between all parties is within the grasp of those involved. It
is important for the Blackfeet tribe to present a united front that truly represents what the
tribal members want. To this extent tribal members should be heavily involved in and

informed about the planning process so their opinions are heard and recognized. It’s also
important for the Blackfeet tribe to communicate clearly to the Forest Service what they
would like to see happen to the Badger Two Medicine area. It’s just as equally important
however that the Forest Service clearly communicates to the tribe what their expectations
are and the guidelines they are required to follow. If either side encounters a problem,
explaining the problem and trying to work towards a solution will be mutually beneficial
for everyone. Sharing in problematic situations can help to prevent situations like the
standoff that has occurred in the Badlands.
Meanwhile, hopes for the nations first Tribal National Park seem to be dwindling.
In an effort to revive the dream of a Tribal National Park the NPS did bring in a new
superintendent and deputy superintendent to BNP. Mike Pflaum, the new superintendent,
“said he wants to work on rebuilding strained relationships with tribal officials and
see…if there is a way to bring back the plan to create the nation's first tribal national
park” (Feldman, 2015). Hopefully this dream will someday become a reality and act as a
model for the future.
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